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### THESIS

**COUNTERNARCOTIC EFFORTS IN THE CARIBBEAN &  
PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION:**

*A Jamaican Case Study*

By

Scott R. Whaley

June 1998

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## 13. ABSTRACT

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This thesis examines the costs and benefits of a region-wide policy for combating the flow of illicit narcotics through the Caribbean and into the United States. The thesis examines past and current regional counternarcotic efforts, including the Model Maritime Agreement, and the role of the United States in these efforts. This thesis specifically addresses the case study of Jamaica, then attempts to apply it in a broad framework to the entire region. Lastly, this thesis assesses the potential for enhanced cooperation in the form of a counternarcotics regime, and the policy implications for both the United States and the Caribbean.

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*A Jamaican Case Study*

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
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


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
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## ABSTRACT

The island Caribbean serves as a major pipeline between Latin America (the world's largest producer of illicit narcotics), and the United States (the world's largest illegal narcotics consumer). Many countries of the Caribbean have bilateral agreements with the U.S. and one another. Further, since the mid 1990s a host of Caribbean nations have signed "ship rider" agreements with the United States, vastly improving the potential for cooperation. Yet, no single region-wide plan exists to coordinate efforts against the transshipment of narcotics. Given the scope of the problem, and the recognition by individual countries of their limitations and constraints, a framework may exist to establish a region-wide counternarcotics regime.

This thesis examines the costs and benefits of a region-wide policy for combating the flow of illicit narcotics through the Caribbean and into the United States. The thesis examines past and current regional counternarcotic efforts, including the Model Maritime Agreement, and the role of the United States in these efforts. This thesis specifically addresses the case study of Jamaica, then attempts to apply it in a broad framework to the entire region. Lastly, this thesis assesses the potential for enhanced cooperation in the form of a counternarcotics regime, and the policy implications for both the United States and the Caribbean.



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The island Caribbean serves as the pipeline between Latin America (the world's largest producer of illicit narcotics), and the United States (the world's largest illegal narcotics consumer). It is estimated that 60 percent of the drugs entering the United States pass through Mexico, with the remaining 40 percent coming through the Caribbean.<sup>1</sup>

Illicit narcotic consumption has risen in the Caribbean as a result of the availability of drugs, as has the gang violence associated with narco-trafficking, and general crime associated with consumption. Additionally, because of the small size and budgets of the governments, and the power of narco-dollars, corruption is on the rise. The political implications of the corruption associated with narco-trafficking corrode the ability of governments to effectively govern by undermining trust and credibility.

The entire island Caribbean has signed the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, and many have bilateral

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<sup>1</sup> Shelly Emling, "Drug Trade Once Again Targeting S. Florida", *Palm Beach Post*, Sunday, March 18, 1998, A1, A22.

agreements with the United States and one another. Yet, no single region-wide plan exists to coordinate efforts against the transshipment of narcotics. Given the scope of the problem, and the recognition by individual countries of their limitations and constraints, a framework may exist to establish a region-wide counternarcotic plan.

This thesis demonstrates that what is required is a comprehensive counternarcotics regime featuring the United States and the island Caribbean. Both the United States and the Island Caribbean have come to the pragmatic realization that they must cooperate on counternarcotics in order to succeed. Given this realization, and the global trend towards multilateral cooperation and regionalization, the potential for region-wide cooperation exists, and the United States should play an integral role in coordinating that cooperation.

This thesis examines the costs and benefits of a region-wide policy for combating the flow of illicit narcotics through the Caribbean and into the United States. In doing this, past and current regional counternarcotic efforts are examined to include the Model Maritime Agreement, as well as the role of the United States in these efforts. This thesis presents a case study of Jamaica as an individual country with an aggressive counternarcotics

policy that cooperates with the United States, yet cannot sufficiently combat drugs on its island. The thesis then broadly applies the findings of the case study across the entire island Caribbean. Lastly, this thesis tests the potential for enhanced cooperation in the form of a counternarcotics regime.

Recently, the United States, numerous Caribbean leaders, and international and regional organizations have stated that improved cooperation on counternarcotics is a necessity. Transnational problems require multinational solutions, and both the Caribbean and the United States recognize this to be true. A counternarcotics regime would further the national interests of both the United States and countries in the Caribbean, by reducing crime, consumption, and corruption, thus protecting and strengthening the small economies and democracies of the Caribbean. Simultaneously, it would improve the efficiency of the U.S. counterdrug efforts.

The United States is the only country with the institutional, economic, and technical resources necessary for developing and coordinating such a regime, and therefore must take the lead in its development. To do otherwise would allow for weak links in the United State's southern

armor, and thus to facilitate increasing levels of drug flow through the Caribbean pipeline directly into America.

## I. DRUG PIPELINE BETWEEN THE AMERICAS

*There is near-universal agreement among officials in various Caribbean, North American, and European capitals that the top security concerns of the region [Caribbean] are drug production, consumption and abuse, trafficking, and money laundering.<sup>2</sup>*

### A. INTRODUCTION

In 1982, the Reagan Administration responded to political and public pressure and declared a "war on drugs," and in 1986, the drug problem was elevated to the status of a "threat to the national security of the United States."<sup>3</sup> Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney signaled an end to Pentagon resistance to involvement in counternarcotics in mid-1989 by stating that for the Pentagon, "detecting and countering the production and trafficking of illegal drugs is a high-priority, national security mission."<sup>4</sup>

Since that time, the U.S. counternarcotics policy has focused on three areas: eradication in the host countries, interdiction in the transit zones, and the reduction of

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<sup>2</sup> Ivelaw L. Griffith, *"Caribbean Regional Security"*, Strategic Forum #102 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1997), 1.

<sup>3</sup> J.F. Holden-Rhodes, *Sharing the Secrets: Open Source Intelligence and the War on Drugs* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 41.

<sup>4</sup> Former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, *"DOD and Its Role in the War Against Drugs"* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989), 1.

domestic demand. The major source countries for cocaine and opium in Latin America are Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, while the major transit areas are the countries of Central America and the Caribbean, as well as Mexico.<sup>5</sup> This thesis is primarily concerned with the role of transshipment zones, specifically those which comprise the Caribbean.

The island Caribbean serves as the pipeline between Latin America (the world's largest producer of illicit narcotics), and the United States (the world's largest illegal narcotics consumer). All islands of the Caribbean are less than 1,500 miles from Bogota, Cali, Medellin, or Caracas, and less than 2,000 miles from Miami. In addition to its strategic location, the Caribbean is ideally suited for clandestine transshipment because it is comprised of thousands of islands and cays, many of which are extremely remote, and virtually unmonitored.

The Bahamas alone, for example, are comprised of over 700 islands and 2,000 cays, with one island, Bimini, less than 40 miles from the Florida Keys. The island Caribbean is further vulnerable because of the poverty in the region.

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<sup>5</sup> General Accounting Office, *DRUG CONTROL: Long-Standing Problems Hinder U.S. International Efforts* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), 1.



Economics make it impossible for the small individual states to support large counternarcotics budgets, simultaneously making them very susceptible to corruption by wealthy drug barons.

Interdiction in the Caribbean has and continues to receive large degrees of governmental support for a wide variety of reasons explained below. This is opposed to the policy of eradication being pursued in supplier countries, which is unpopular because of the asymmetrical costs borne by the farmer and peasants, as opposed to the wealthy drug cartels. An additional disadvantage of eradication is that it causes a tremendous amount of political problems. Interdiction of transshipments, however, is less politically sensitive.

Illicit narcotic consumption has risen in the Caribbean as a result of the availability of drugs. So too has the gang violence associated with narco-trafficking, and general crime associated with consumption. Additionally, because of the small size and budgets of the governments, and the power of narco-dollars, corruption is on the rise. The political implications of the corruption associated with narco-trafficking corrode the ability of governments to effectively govern by undermining trust and credibility.

The entire island Caribbean has signed the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, and many have bilateral agreements with the United States and one another. Yet, no single region-wide plan exists to coordinate efforts against the transshipment of narcotics. Since the mid 1990s, however, a host of Caribbean nations have signed "ship rider" agreements with the United States, vastly improving the potential for cooperation. Given the scope of the problem, and the recognition by individual countries of their limitations and constraints, a framework may exist to establish a region-wide counternarcotic plan.

#### **1. Thesis Statement**

My thesis is that individual countries in the Caribbean cannot, on their own, effectively combat the flow of narcotics through the region. What is needed is a comprehensive counternarcotics regime featuring the United States and the island Caribbean. The United States is the only country with the financial, institutional, and technical resources necessary for establishing, organizing, and implementing such a plan. The potential for region-wide cooperation exists, and the United States should play an integral role in coordinating that cooperation. Further,

the development of a regional counternarcotics regime with strong legislation, mutually supportive policies, and intelligence sharing would enable the Caribbean and the United States to significantly affect the level of narco-trafficking through the region.

This thesis will examine the costs and benefits of a region-wide policy for combating the flow of illicit narcotics through the Caribbean and into the United States. In doing this, past and current regional counternarcotic efforts will be examined to include the Model Maritime Agreement, as will the role of the United States in these efforts. Specifically, this thesis will present a case study of Jamaica, then attempt to broadly apply the findings across the entire island Caribbean. Lastly, this thesis will seek to test for the potential for enhanced cooperation in the form of a counternarcotics regime.

## **2. Definition of the Caribbean**

For the purpose of this thesis, the Caribbean is defined as the islands of the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. This includes all islands between the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago, the Yucatan Channel, and the eastern side of Barbados. As such, Belize, Guyana, and Suriname are not included in my definition. However, because in some

circumstances they are considered Caribbean, they may appear in quotes or in statistics. While this thesis will focus primarily upon the principal transit countries, it is applicable to all states of the region, because no country has been left unaffected by the narcotics trade and its side affects. Figure 1.1 below shows the area defined as the island Caribbean.

Figure 1.1  
Map of the Island Caribbean



Source: Ivelaw L. Griffith, *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean: Problems and Promises in Subordinate States* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993), no page given.

## B. SIGNIFICANCE

The United States and the Caribbean share a special relationship because of geography, history, and economics. The role of the Caribbean in narcotics transshipment, and the threat that it poses to Caribbean security cannot be overstated. It is estimated that 60 percent of the drugs entering America pass through Mexico, with the remaining 40 percent coming through the Caribbean.<sup>6</sup> However, these numbers can be slightly misleading because much of the drugs entering through Mexico must first cross portions of the Caribbean.

In November 1994, Barry McCaffrey, the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, declared Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands to be High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA).<sup>7</sup> According to the General Accounting Office, by 1996 Puerto Rico had become the major entry point for cocaine moving through the Eastern

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<sup>6</sup> Shelly Emling, "Drug Trade Once Again Targeting S. Florida", Palm Beach Post, Sunday, March 18, 1998, A1, A22. Emling's numbers are from the United Nations Drug Control Program. Just one year earlier the General Accounting Office reported the numbers to be 70 percent and 30 percent, showing the increasing importance of the Caribbean to drug trafficking. General Accounting Office, *DRUG CONTROL: U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean Decline* (GAO/NSIAD-96-119) (Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1996), 3.

<sup>7</sup> U.S. Congress. House. *War on Drugs in the Western Hemisphere: Fact or Fiction?*, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 1996. Federal Drug Control Budget brief given by Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), 46.

Caribbean. Further, in 1994 Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands accounted for 26 percent of the documented attempts to smuggle cocaine into the U.S.<sup>8</sup>

On 11 May 1998, the New York Times stated that law enforcement officials estimate that as much as one third of the 300 metric tons of cocaine that annually enter the United States is transported by Dominican Republic drug traffickers. While the Colombian cartels used to jealously guard every stage of the cocaine business, they now work with the Dominicans, vastly expanding the role that the Caribbean plays in the drug trade. Accordingly, the Dominicans' share of the cocaine trade has more than doubled since the early 1990s.<sup>9</sup>

Because of the success of interdicting illegal air traffic, shipping is becoming increasingly important. The Office of Naval Intelligence estimates that 70-80 percent of all narcotics trade is shipped on commercial and noncommercial sea going vessels.<sup>10</sup> This further highlights the crucial role that the Caribbean plays as the drug

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<sup>8</sup> GAO, *U.S. Interdiction Efforts Decline*, 4-5.

<sup>9</sup> Clifford Krauss and Larry Rother, "Dominican Drug Traffickers Tighten Grip on the Northeast", *The New York Times*, VOL. CXXVII No. 51,154, 11 May 1998, A1, A17.

<sup>10</sup> Office of Naval Intelligence, *Worldwide Maritime Challenges 1997* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), 10.

noncommercial sea going vessels.<sup>10</sup> This further highlights the crucial role that the Caribbean plays as the drug pipeline between the Americas. From 1984 to 1986, the level of narco-trafficking through the region increased by 8,265 percent.<sup>11</sup> "Latin American countries supply one-third of the heroin, perhaps 80 percent of the marijuana, and all the cocaine currently used in the United States, representing more than three-fourths of the U.S. drug market..."<sup>12</sup> Further, according to the New York Times, "...in fiscal year 1997, the United States Custom Service in Florida, the main point of entry for drugs from the Caribbean, confiscated 14,000 pounds of cocaine, a 100 percent increase over fiscal year 1996."<sup>13</sup>

The threat posed by drugs and its associated dangers are four pronged, and best explained by the list below from "Caribbean Regional Security."

1. These operations have multiple consequences and implications - such as marked increases in crime,

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<sup>10</sup> Office of Naval Intelligence, *Worldwide Maritime Challenges 1997* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), 10.

<sup>11</sup> Jorge I. Dominguez, Robert A. Pastor, and R. Delisle Worrell ed. *Democracy in the Caribbean* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 231.

<sup>12</sup> Michael A. Morris, *Caribbean Maritime Security* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 132.

<sup>13</sup> Krauss and Rother, "Dominican Drug Dealers", A17.

4. The sovereignty of many countries is severely tested and subject to infringement, by both state and non-state actors, because of drugs.<sup>14</sup>

The potential threat of political instability resulting from governmental corruption and narcoterrorism, as well as the significance of the domestic drug problem, make a region-wide effort critical. Additionally, in the 1997 National Security Strategy, President Clinton stated that improving international cooperation, and cost and burden sharing in counternarcotics is a priority. As a result, strengthening the regional counter-drug effort is a priority for the advancement of the national interests of America.

#### C. METHODOLOGY

This thesis will present a single case study of Jamaica as an individual country with an aggressive counternarcotics policy that cooperates with the United States, yet because of its small budget, large coastline, and weak counternarcotics legislation, cannot sufficiently combat drugs on the island. This case study will examine the efforts put forth by the Jamaican government, their successes and failures, the role of the U.S. in providing equipment, training, and funds, the shortfalls of a single

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<sup>14</sup> Griffith, *"Caribbean Regional Security"*, 2.



nation effort, and the potential for integrated regional cooperation. Jamaica's role in regional cooperation was evidenced by the opening, in December 1996, of the Caribbean Regional Drug Law Enforcement Training Center in Jamaica. The first class to graduate from the two-week course had 25 students, 13 of whom were Jamaican, with the remaining 12 being from nine other Caribbean islands.

This case study will attempt to use Jamaica as a specific case, then apply it as a general model for the entire Caribbean. Inherently there are pitfalls in using a single case and trying to apply it broadly. However, I believe that because of Jamaica's broad interaction throughout the Caribbean, its relations within the region, and with the United States, it will be a suitable case study. In examining the potential for cooperation I will highlight problem areas such as issues of national sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

### **1. Competing Hypotheses**

This thesis will examine two competing hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that because of current widescale regional interaction through a broad spectrum of political, economic, and social ties, a framework for regional cooperation on counternarcotics does exist. Further,

because of the scope of the problem, and the recognition that the region does not have the physical assets or financial resources to combat the problem alone, the Caribbean will realize that the benefits of an increased region-wide policy outweigh the potential costs of such cooperation.

The second, and competing hypothesis, is that a counternarcotics regime in the Caribbean is not possible, and the current level of cooperation will stagnate rather than deepen. This is because the nations of the Caribbean will perceive the costs of cooperation to outweigh the benefits. This hypothesis posits that issues such as national sovereignty, and territorial integrity outweigh the benefits of cooperation on counternarcotics.

#### D. CONCLUSION

In analyzing the potential for cooperation, the thesis will examine regime theory, methods of cooperation, and the importance of international organizations. Specifically, this thesis will examine the role of regimes in facilitating international cooperation as advanced by Robert O. Keohane and Andrew Axline.<sup>15</sup> Additionally, Lisa Martin's methods of

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<sup>15</sup> Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984),

cooperation will be utilized to explain three potential paths towards cooperation.<sup>16</sup>

Recently, the U.S., numerous Caribbean leaders, and international and regional organizations have stated that improved cooperation on counternarcotics is a necessity. Transnational problems require multinational solutions, and both the Caribbean and the United States recognize this to be true. This thesis will attempt to validate the assertion that enhanced cooperation on counternarcotics is not only a necessity, but that it is also possible and desirable.

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and Andrew Axline, *The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation: Comparative Case Studies* (London: Printer Publishers, 1994).

<sup>16</sup> Lisa Martin, *Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).



## II. THE DRUG WAR

*The United States must continue assisting major drug-producing and transit countries that demonstrate the political will to attack illegal drug production and trafficking.*<sup>17</sup>

### A. U.S. STRATEGY

The 1996 U.S. Drug Control Strategy has five stated goals, the first of which is to motivate America's youth to reject illegal drugs and substance abuse. Second, is to increase the safety of U.S. citizens by reducing drug-related violence and crime. Third, is to reduce the health and welfare costs resulting from illegal drug use. Fourth, is to shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat. The fifth and final goal is to break foreign and domestic sources of supply.<sup>18</sup> Of the five aforementioned goals, the military is primarily concerned with the last two. These two objectives are covered in the interdiction and international support portion of the counternarcotics plan and budget. Anti-narcotics spending is broken down into four functional areas: domestic demand

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<sup>17</sup> United States Department of State, *Enhanced Multilateral Drug Control Cooperation: A Counternarcotics Alliance for the Hemisphere*, Section V., 6. Obtained via the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) webpage. located at: [www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov](http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov)

<sup>18</sup> General Accounting Office, *Long-Standing Problems*, 1.

reduction, domestic law enforcement, international support, and interdiction.

The total U.S. counternarcotics budget for fiscal year 1997 was \$13.8 billion dollars.<sup>19</sup> The largest portion of this budget went to treatment, followed by corrections, investigations, state and local efforts, prevention, interdiction, prosecutions, research and development, international, intelligence, and other law enforcement, in that order.<sup>20</sup> To put things into perspective, the international drug control budget in fiscal year 1995 was only \$850 million, 6 percent of the total anti-drug budget. That is the value equivalent of 8.5 metric tons of cocaine. There are single drug busts that are larger and worth more than that.<sup>21</sup>

On 6 June 1996, the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, Barry McCaffrey testified to Congress that illegal drugs had cost the U.S. \$300 billion dollars in the 1990s. During that same period, drugs caused no less

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<sup>19</sup> According to the GAO, U.S. federal drug control spending is divided into four areas: demand reduction, domestic law enforcement, international, and interdiction. In fiscal year 1997, \$400 million has been slated for international, while \$1.4 billion has been funded for interdiction.

<sup>20</sup> U.S. Congress. House, *War on Drugs*, 47-50.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 50.

than 100,000 deaths, 500,000 emergency room cases, and drug use was involved in one-third of all homicide cases.<sup>22</sup>

#### B. CONSUMPTION & CORRUPTION

Demand for illicit narcotics in Europe is also increasing, especially for Latin American cocaine. Further, illicit narcotic consumption has risen in the Caribbean as a result of the availability of drugs. This is especially true of the primary transit states of the Bahamas, Belize, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Guyana, Puerto Rico, and Trinidad and Tobago.<sup>23</sup> This rise in consumption is caused largely by the spillover effect. The spillover effect means that as drugs transit through a country, a certain amount of them are consumed by that society.

In addition to a rise in consumption of illicit narcotics in the Caribbean, there also has been a rise in the level of gang violence associated with narco-trafficking, especially in Jamaica. The cost of controlling general crime associated with consumption, and treating the growing number of addicts, is placing additional strains on

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>23</sup> Ivelaw L. Griffith, "Caribbean Manifestations of the Narcotics Phenomenon" in, Jorge Rodriguez Beruff, and Humberto Garcia Muniz ed. *Security Problems and Policies in the Post-Cold War Caribbean* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1996), 183.

the small size and budgets of the governments, and the power of narco-dollars, corruption is on the rise.

For example, in March 1985, the Prime Minister of the Turks and Caicos Islands, Norman Saunders, and two of his ministers were arrested in Miami, Florida, for facilitating the transshipment of narcotics into the United States.<sup>24</sup> Saunders and all involved were convicted in July 1985, due to overwhelming evidence including videotapes of Saunders accepting bribes from undercover DEA agents. What is particularly significant about this example is that it occurred three years after the commencement of Operation Bahamas, and the Turks and Caicos (OPBAT), demonstrating the ability of narco-traffickers to penetrate the highest level of even those governments formally committed to stopping the flow of drugs through the region.<sup>25</sup> In 1987, due to drug trafficking related activities, 51 Trinidad and Tobago policemen were suspended and the Commissioner of Police resigned. In March 1992, a Royal Bahamas Police Force (RBPF) sergeant, who worked with the Bahamas special drug

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<sup>24</sup> Dominguez, Pastor, and Worrell ed., *Democracy in the Caribbean*, 230.

<sup>25</sup> OPBAT, signed in 1982, is a joint U.S. and Bahamian and Turks and Caicos Islands effort to interdict narco-traffickers. OPBAT involves close coordination to stop air, land, and sea shipping, allows for "hot pursuit", has joint manning of law enforcement bases, and has a ship rider agreement. The Bahamas were the first island to give permission for "hot pursuit" of suspects into their territorial waters.



(RBPF) sergeant, who worked with the Bahamas special drug court, was arrested for possession and intent to supply 6 kilograms of cocaine.<sup>26</sup>

Lastly, for example, the Commissioner of Police of Antigua and Barbuda makes \$2,000 a month, a Barbuda senior customs official makes only \$483 monthly, while a pilot flying narcotics may make over \$100,000 in a few hours.<sup>27</sup> In comparing the income of the police or the customs official with that of the pilot, it becomes clear that there is a huge disparity, even at the base level of the drug war. It is in this enormous difference that lies the power to corrupt.

Security, according to Professor Ivelaw Griffith, means "the protection and preservation of a people's freedom from external military attacks and coercion, freedom from internal subversion and from the erosion of cherished political, economic and social values."<sup>28</sup> The political implications of the corruption associated with narco-trafficking corrode the ability of governments to effectively govern by undermining trust and credibility.

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<sup>26</sup> Griffith, *Caribbean Manifestations*, 188-189.

<sup>27</sup> Dominguez, Pastor, and Worrell ed. *Democracy in the Caribbean*, 230.

<sup>28</sup> Griffith, *Caribbean Manifestations*, 181.

Further, it distorts politicians' views, and can lead to widespread cynicism among the populace, further undermining the ability of the government to react to national security threats.

Thus, narco-traffickers pose a threat to the security, sovereignty, and legitimacy of Caribbean governments. Additionally, because of the aforementioned factors, and the negative image associated with it, tourism has suffered in some of the islands. Therefore, drugs stress the small economies of the Caribbean for numerous reasons including: the loss of tourism resulting from bad press due to drug trafficking and the related violence; cost of rehabilitation; increasing cost of maintaining interdiction forces; investigations and incarceration; as well as lost production due to drug problems in the work environment. In essence, drugs are choking the society from the outside and draining it from within. As a result, the Caribbean nations have a clear interest in stopping the flow of narcotics through the region.

#### **C. MULTILAYERED & MULTINATIONAL RESPONSE?**

Because of the international scope of the drug problem and its multidimensional nature, a successful drug policy needs to be multilayered. In other words, countries need to have strong national policies that simultaneously address

demand reduction, interdiction, eradication, and legislation and prosecution. In addition, they need regional and international plans since illegal narcotics are an international problem. Lastly, a successful policy also needs to incorporate numerous outside actors, both state and nonstate, because the problem is too large and too expensive for a single country to manage on its own.

In order for the drug control strategy to be successful, all aspects of the plan must be implemented concurrently with both force and dedication, following a carefully thought out long-term plan. At the source country level, eradication of drug crops is extremely important because it eliminates drugs before they enter the pipeline. Starting in 1993 President Clinton announced that the primary source countries should be the focus of the U.S. international drug control effort.<sup>29</sup>

However, despite some of the success of the eradication programs in Bolivia, Colombia, Jamaica, Mexico, and Peru, the number of hectares dedicated to producing illicit narcotics continues to rise. Between 1988 and 1995, 56,000 hectares of coca plants were destroyed, while

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<sup>29</sup> Presidential Decision Directive 14, signed November 3, 1993. PDD-14 switched the focus of international support towards eradication in the three primary Latin American supplier countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.

simultaneously the number of hectares under cultivation for coca in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru increased from 186,240 to 214,800.<sup>30</sup> Thus, despite eradication efforts, the amount of land dedicated to growing illicit narcotics is at best constant, and may even be increasing, not decreasing.

In addition, thousands of hectares are dedicated to the harvesting of opium poppy in Mexico, and especially in Colombia where production and exportation is rapidly expanding. Colombian cartels are rapidly entering the opium market because of the increasing demand, the high profit margin, and relative value per shipment. In the same way that cocaine shipments are smaller (thus easier to smuggle) and more valuable than marijuana, heroin shipments are smaller and more valuable than cocaine. According to The Palm Beach Post, the U.S. Customs Service in Florida reported only two heroin seizures between 1978-1988. However, that number rose to 29 in 1996 alone, and to 45 in 1997. Further, unlike heroin in the 1970s that was only 10 percent pure, Colombian heroin is 90 percent pure, making it more addictive.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> General Accounting Office, *Long-Standing Problems*, 6.

<sup>31</sup> Emling, "Drug Trade Targeting S. Florida", A22.

The policy of eradication being pursued in supplier countries frequently is unpopular because of the asymmetrical costs borne by the farmer and peasants, as opposed to the wealthy drug cartels. Hundreds of thousands of campesinos work in the coca and opium fields, and eradication of these crops would devastate the economies of supplier countries. Therefore, much of the success of eradication programs relies upon the support of the local government, their national police forces and military, and the development of alternative cash crops. According to the U.S. Department of State, "since large-scale eradication, however, is not politically feasible in many countries, we must also aggressively attack drug refining and transshipment..."<sup>32</sup> Thus, while eradication is important, it is not a panacea for the U.S. drug problem.

Aside from eradication, which falls under international support in the 1996 Drug Control Strategy, the other area of active overseas involvement is interdiction. The area of interdiction that this thesis is concerned with is in the transit or transshipment zones of the Caribbean. Despite the noteworthy efforts of the Colombian National Police, and

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<sup>32</sup> U.S. Department of State, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* (INCSR) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), 4.

their counterparts in other producer countries, tremendous quantities of narcotics still leave South America every day. Accordingly, the United States and the rest of the world need to aggressively patrol and intercept drug trafficking in the crucial air and sea-lanes of the Caribbean.

Though Presidential Decision Directive-14 shifted the focus of the U.S. Drug War, the previously noted rise in the hectares dedicated to coca development, coupled with the enormity of the world-wide demand for narcotics makes interdiction extremely important. For the national and international counternarcotics policies to be effective, all aspects need to be strong and efficient.

However, since the signing of PDD-14, interdiction has suffered measurable setbacks. "Between 1993 and the first six months of 1995, the transit zone 'disruption rate' - the ability of U.S. forces to seize or otherwise turn back drug shipments - dropped 53 percent, from 435.1 kilograms per day to 205.2 kilograms..."<sup>33</sup> The disruption rate has been affected by decreased funding for interdiction, which has resulted in reduced "steaming days" for the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, reduced "flight hours" for aircraft, reduced radar coverage,

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<sup>33</sup> U.S. Congress. Senate, *Losing Ground Against Drugs: A Report on Increasing Illicit Drug Use and National Drug Policy*, Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), 13.

and the reassignment and mothballing of assets formerly used for interdiction. Accordingly, those monies and resources dedicated to interdiction need to be utilized as efficiently and effectively as possible.

One way to make the U.S. anti-trafficking policy stronger would be to bolster the ability of small Caribbean countries to monitor and patrol their own territorial waters. The most politically acceptable, cost efficient, and effective policy would be one which created a region wide counternarcotics effort or regime. In other words, a series of agreements which develop a framework for inter-regional cooperation at the highest level. This region-wide policy should include the entire island Caribbean, as well as the United States. There need not be a single force or a combined military. Rather, there needs to be an integrated series of radar facilities, intelligence sharing, and either joint patrols, or permission for "hot pursuit" of suspects into neighboring territorial waters or airspace. Additionally, the region should have strong legislation with stringent anti-drug and money laundering laws, and there should be region-wide extradition agreements.

## 1. Current Cooperation

A framework for widespread regional cooperation already exists as evidenced by the numerous regional and international agreements of which regional members are signatories. Much of the Caribbean has signed Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) with the United States, to include: Antigua-Barbuda, the Bahamas, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname, St. Kitts-Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago. These agreements provide for joint training, interdiction, asset and intelligence sharing, extradition, 'hot pursuit,' and equipment and technical support.<sup>34</sup> Additionally, some agreements allow for host nations to place police or military personnel aboard U.S. Coast Guard vessels. Once embarked, these personnel can give permission for the vessel to board, make arrests, and confiscate drugs while in Caribbean territorial waters.

Further, many of the countries have bilateral agreements (BILATs) with one another, for example Jamaica-Cuba, Mexico-Belize, and Trinidad and Tobago-Venezuela, just to name a few. The Bahamas, Great Britain, and the United States entered into a multilateral arrangement in July 1990,

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<sup>34</sup> Griffith, *Caribbean Regional Security*, 4.



which effectively expanded OPBAT's operational network. Other regional and international efforts include the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP), Caribbean Law Enforcement and Intelligence Committee (CLEIC), United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNAC), Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), OAS Money Laundering Experts Group, and the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP). Lastly, although not a counternarcotics and security organization, the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), shows that wide-scale interdependence and cooperation already exist in the Caribbean.

The Caribbean Community and Common Market came into existence in 1973, with the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas. The initial members were Anguilla, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Montserrat, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.<sup>35</sup> Since that time membership has expanded to include: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,

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<sup>35</sup> Sandra W. Meditz, and Dennis M. Hanratty ed., *Islands of the Caribbean Commonwealth: A Regional Study* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 654-655.

Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago, showing the existing depth of current integration.<sup>36</sup> Despite the challenges posed by Jamaica and Grenada's socialist experiments, and numerous other problems, CARICOM has marched on for 25 years. The nations of the Caribbean enjoy a relationship of complex interdependence, and are enjoined in numerous arrangements addressing a wide variety of issues. Formulating a new regime specifically to address narcotics trafficking is a logical progression for the nations of the Caribbean.

By cooperating on the seas, in the air, and on the ground, the entire region would benefit because there would be a synergistic effect from the combination of all the individual countries' assets. This would make it far more difficult for narco-traffickers to find and exploit weak links. Currently, efforts to stop drug trafficking in the Caribbean are only as good as the weakest link. This is because if the Bahamas or Jamaica increase the pressure on trafficking, then the traffickers will simply move their business to a country with less capable counternarcotic forces and more lenient laws. However, if the entire Caribbean has the same counternarcotic policies and laws,

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<sup>36</sup> World Bank Press Release, "World Bank President At CARICOM Summit," March 5, 1996, 1.

and cooperate militarily with the United States and one another, the weak link will largely be mitigated. Drug trafficking is like a disease; it attacks the weakest area and exploits its vulnerabilities. Increased cooperation could reduce these weaknesses.

Because the costs of fighting the drug war are so high, it makes further sense to combine the U.S. efforts with those of other nations in a unified counternarcotics policy designed to reduce the level of narco-trafficking through the Caribbean. This policy would be consistent with the stated U.S. counternarcotics goal of sharing the cost burden of the drug war with other countries and multilateral organizations. Further, this policy would also conform to President Clinton's foreign policy plan of "Engagement and Enlargement". By limiting corruption and strengthening legislation throughout the region, the policy would also help to reinforce the democratic institutions of the Caribbean, thereby helping to improve hemispheric security through fostering political stability. An additional benefit to this plan is that it could be a symmetrical policy, as opposed to the U.S.-imposed asymmetrical policies of the past. Making the plan as symmetrical as possible would increase its popularity in region while reducing the image that it was imposed from the North.

The individual island states of the Caribbean are very small, and have extremely limited human, institutional, and economic resources to devote to counternarcotics. These limited resources compete with widespread poverty and other competing demands, further straining the capability of countries to respond to a vital national security threat. For example, in 1990, Barbuda and Antigua budgeted only \$2 million (USD) for counternarcotics, and actually spent less.<sup>37</sup> In Table 2.1, derived from a Joint Interagency Task Force East (JIATF-E) table, it is clear just how limited some of the counternarcotic forces are in the Caribbean.

Table 2.1  
Selected Eastern Caribbean Maritime Interdiction Assets,  
1995

Nation	Interdiction Assets
British Virgin Islands	6 patrol boats, 1 aircraft
Anguilla	2 boats
St. Martin/ Guadeloupe/Martinique	3 patrol boats, 6 aircraft, 4 helicopters
Antigua/Barbuda	3 boats
St. Kitts	4 boats
Montserrat	1 patrol Craft with 1 crew
Dominica	4 boats
St. Lucia	4 boats, 2 of which are damaged
St. Vincent	4 boats
Barbados	5 boats, 1 possibly damaged
Grenada	4 boats
Trinidad and Tobago	large, medium, and small platforms

Source: Joint Interagency Task Force-East (JIATF-E), contained in GAO, *U.S. Interdiction in Caribbean Decline*, 10.

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<sup>37</sup> Dominguez, Pastor, and Worrell ed., *Democracy in the Caribbean*, 230.

Source: Joint Interagency Task Force-East (JIATF-E), contained in GAO, *U.S. Interdiction in Caribbean Decline*, 10.

As the largest spender, the United States will spend approximately \$1.5 billion in interdiction and international support in fiscal year 1997, while the annual world drug trade is estimated to be over \$500 billion. These numbers show that in order for the U.S. policies to be effective, every dollar needs to be used as effectively and efficiently as possible. The flow of drugs through the United States will never be completely stopped, but it can be slowed down. Similarly, corruption will never be completely stamped out, but a regional plan including similar legislation and policies would make it far more difficult for corruption to have the wide-scale influence that it has today.

#### **D. CONCLUSION**

In conclusion, as evidenced above, both the United States and the Caribbean have a significant interest in reducing the flow of drugs through the region. The United States and the Caribbean both suffer from consumption problems, as well as from increasing levels of violence, and from the tremendous costs associated with treating addicts of illegal narcotics. Because drugs affect both the United

there is great potential for wide-scale and far ranging cooperation.

In order to have a region-wide policy, there has to be a region-wide acceptance of a problem which, as will be demonstrated in Chapter IV, now exists. Because of this acceptance, the opportunity to initiate a U.S.-led comprehensive region-wide counternarcotics policy should not be lost. It is clearly in the national interest of both the United States and the nations of the Caribbean. Lastly, this policy would be consistent with the U.S. government's foreign policy and would advance its national interests.

Kenneth McNeil, a Jamaican governmental minister, stated that the measures taken by the individual Caribbean islands "fall short of a regional response which will be necessary in the development of a sustained Caribbean initiative. The Caribbean countries do not possess either the facilities or the resources to achieve this most important objective."<sup>38</sup> Cooperation in the Caribbean is further possible because of the good relations of most of the region with the United States and with one another, as

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<sup>38</sup> Kenneth McNeil, "Development of Cocaine Trafficking in Jamaica", keynote address at World Ministerial Summit to Reduce the Demand for Drugs and to Combat the Cocaine Threat, 1993, quoted in Jorge I. Dominguez, Robert A. Pastor, and R. Delisle Worrell ed. *Democracy in the Caribbean: Political, Economic, and Social Perspectives* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993), 233.

evidenced by CARICOM, and a host of other bilateral and multilateral arrangements. Further, it is consistent with the international and hemispheric trend towards interdependence, and regionalization. The region, to include the United States, must form a region-wide policy to coordinate efforts against the transshipment of illegal narcotics. To do otherwise is to allow for weak links in the United State's southern armor, and thus to facilitate increasing levels of drug flow through the Caribbean pipeline directly into America.





### III. JAMAICAN CASE STUDY

*...All governments must recognize that international stability and national sovereignty will never be secure as long as the drug trade prospers. The drug trade survives by a strategy of corrupt and divide.<sup>39</sup>*

#### A. INTRODUCTION

##### 1. Jamaican Efforts and Issues

On 28 February 1997, President William J. Clinton announced that Jamaica, as a major narcotics-producing and transit country, had again been certified as a country that is cooperating and complying with the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.<sup>40</sup> Though relations between the United States and the government of Jamaica have not always been cordial, Jamaica has been certified for the last 12 years in a row.

However, despite numerous successes, U.S.-Jamaican joint counternarcotic efforts have not always succeeded, nor have they maintained their momentum and initiative. Some

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<sup>39</sup> INCSR, 4.

<sup>40</sup> INCSR, XXIV. The 1998 INCSR was not yet available for public use when this thesis was written. Accordingly there are no statistics for 1997-98 contained in this chapter. However, Jamaica was again certified in 1998, reflecting continuing cooperation.

years there have been setbacks in the number of cannabis crops destroyed, arrests made, and drugs confiscated. Nonetheless, Jamaica has remained a consistent ally of the United States in the war against drugs.

This chapter will examine the nature of U.S.-Jamaican relations, the level of cooperation, and areas of conflict. The question to be answered is whether the United States and Jamaica can cooperate on counternarcotics to an even further extent, and if so, how and why. Finally, if the United States and Jamaica can further cooperate, despite disagreements, what are the possible implications for the rest of the Caribbean?

Jamaica is in a unique situation as one of the very few countries in the world that is both a major producer and a major transit area of illicit narcotics. By definition, a major producer of cannabis is a country in which 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis are annually harvested or cultivated. A major transit country is one through which a significant amount of illegal drugs transit enroute to the United States.<sup>41</sup> In the Jamaican case, the drug is primarily cocaine, although Jamaica, like the rest of the Caribbean, is registering increasing levels of heroin

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
<sup>41</sup> INSCR, 35.

traffic.<sup>42</sup> The other countries in the Caribbean that have been identified as either major producers or transit areas are Aruba, The Bahamas, Dominican Republic, and Haiti.<sup>43</sup> As such, Jamaica faces a difficult problem because it is a producer and a conduit, as well as a consumer.

## B. ERADICATION AND ARRESTS

As can be seen in Figure 3.1, marijuana is produced throughout Jamaica in small plots.

Figure 3.1  
Main Ganja Cultivation Areas in Jamaica



Source: Ivelaw L. Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1997), 35.

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., vii. Although Cuba is strategically located for drug trade, and despite credible reports that traffickers use Cuban waters and airspace, according to the U.S. State Department, such activity has not been confirmed. Therefore, Cuba does not appear on the INSCR list of majors.

Indica and sinsemilla are the most common local variants, and grow four to six harvestable crops annually.<sup>44</sup>

Eradication efforts in Jamaica are hampered because the cannabis crops are frequently intermixed with legitimate legal crops, making detection very difficult from the air. Further, the government of Jamaica opposes aerial eradication of cannabis for both environmental and political reasons. Accordingly, cannabis crops, once detected, must be destroyed manually, which is an arduous and inefficient process.

The Government of Jamaica eradicated 473 hectares of cannabis in 1996, opposed to 695 hectares in 1995. Eradication efforts in 1996 were slowed down however, during a three-month period when Jamaica's helicopters provided by the United States, were grounded by a U.S. safety-of-flight order. During the three months, eradicators continued their efforts and were transported to sites by truck. This however, was slow, and some plots located on mountainous ridges were inaccessible by truck.<sup>45</sup> The table below derived from the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of 1997, shows Jamaican eradication levels from 1986

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 192.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 191.

through 1996. An important item to note is the significant reduction in potential yield that has occurred over the 11-year period.

Table 3.1  
Jamaican Cannabis Statistics, 1986-1996

Calendar Year	1996	1995	1994	1993	1992	1991	1990	1989	1988	1987	1986
Harvestable Cultivation (Hectares)	527	305	308	744	389	950	1220	280	607	680	2600
Eradication (Hectares)	473	695	692	456	811	833	1030	1510	650	650	2200
Cultivation (Hectares)	1000	1000	1000	1200	1200	1783	2250	1790	1257	1330	4800
Potential Yield (Metric Tons)	356	206	208	502	263	641	825	189	405	460	1755

Source: INSCR, 1995.

One of the primary reasons for the overall reduction in potential yield is that the level of harvestable cultivation has been reduced by over half since 1985. Huge plots of up to 50 acres were used to grow cannabis. Now because of eradication efforts, remote one-acre plots are the norm. Accordingly, the success of eradication has forced marijuana cultivators to less fertile grounds, and to smaller, less efficient plots.

In addition to a slight reduction in the amount of cannabis that was eradicated in 1996, there was a slight reduction in cocaine seizures, and drug-related arrests. There was, however, a significant increase in the amount of marijuana seized, and a slight increase in heroin seizures

as well. "According to DEA, Jamaican police counternarcotics cooperation in 1996 remained at the high levels of 1995...."<sup>46</sup>

In 1996 the number of drug related arrests dropped slightly below the number from 1995, but remained significantly higher than those of the previous few years. According to the U.S. Department of State, "[r]eported drug arrests in 1996 included 2,996 Jamaicans and 267 foreigners for a total of 3,263 arrests, which was slightly reduced from the total arrests in 1995 (3,705)."<sup>47</sup>

One of the problems that the Jamaican government encounters in its war against drugs is the nature of marijuana use in Jamaican culture. Rastafarians, a significant cultural group both in terms of size and influence, use marijuana for socioreligious purposes. Furthermore, they state that it is an herb and not a drug, citing numerous biblical passages to validate their assertions. Accordingly, marijuana use in Jamaica is widely accepted in large segments of Jamaican society.

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 189. The 1996 INSCR said that cooperation between the United States and Jamaican law enforcement was at the highest level in five years. As cited in GAO, *U.S. Interdiction Efforts Decline*, 9.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 191.



### C. CRIME

For each of the 13 years between 1983-1995 Jamaica recorded an increase in nearly every category of crime, with a rise in the total number of incidents of nearly 10,000. Table 3.2, derived from Ivelaw Griffith's Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege, shows this situation quite clearly.

Table 3.2  
Jamaican Criminal Activity, 1983-1995

Year	Homicides	Sex Offenses	Serious Assaults	Thefts	Fraud	Drug Offenses	Total*
1983	483	825	681	22,030	1,544	4,250	29,813
1986	449	NR	729	23,949	1,584	4,123	30,834
1987	442	1,007	894	22,055	1,563	4,395	30,356
1988	414	1,118	812	19,769	1,533	3,533	27,179
1989	439	1,090	651	19,684	1,393	4,086	27,343
1990	542	1,006	12,375	16,278	1,297	5,433	37,031
1991	561	1,091	10,698	16,476	1,661	6,711	37,198
1992	629	1,108	12,368	14,521	1,721	6,298	36,645
1993	653	1,121	12,710	15,454	2,039	6,915	38,892
1994	690	1,070	13,855	14,453	1,853	5,859	37,780
1995	780	1,605	14,883	13,766	2,429	6,074	39,537

\*This total is a total of the categories represented not a total of all crimes in the country. Data for 1984-1985 was not available.

Source: Griffith, *Drugs and Security*, 121.

As a result, the Jamaican government faces numerous obstacles in its counternarcotics efforts. Nonetheless, it continues to eradicate cannabis, make arrests, and in



general support the United States, the United Nations, and other counternarcotic institutions in their war against drugs.

#### **D. JAMAICAN COUNTERNARCOTICS ELEMENTS**

##### **1. National Level**

The drug war in Jamaica is principally directed by two entities. The first is the National Council On Drug Abuse (NCDA), whose functions include domestic monitoring, prevention, and education concerning illicit narcotics. The second entity is the Ministry of National Security and Justice, whose functions include formulating and implementing operational policies to suppress and eradicate drugs, coordinating the direction of all anti-drug activities, and encouraging regional and interregional cooperation.<sup>48</sup>

##### **2. Counternarcotics Forces**

###### **a) *The Jamaican Defense Force (JDF)***

At the tactical level Jamaica's counternarcotics effort is focused around two institutions: The Jamaican Defense Force (JDF), and the Jamaican Constabulary Force

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<sup>48</sup> Information obtained from the United Nations International Narcotics Control Board Internet site, Jamaica section. [Http://www.undcp.org](http://www.undcp.org).

(JCF). In 1992, the JDF's personnel strength was just under 2,000, and the JCF was manned at 5601.<sup>49</sup> As such, the JDF is the largest military in the English speaking Caribbean and an important institution regionally. The JDF became operational in July, 1962, just two weeks before Jamaica's independence from Great Britain.<sup>50</sup> Ivelaw Griffith writes that "[a]lthough the JDF had been designed for external security, the absence of any 'clear and present' external danger, coupled with the rise in domestic violence led to a metamorphosis in the army's security operation."<sup>51</sup> Accordingly, beginning in 1969, the JDF began to serve more domestic security functions.

The JDF, according to its mission statement, is charged with the defense of Jamaica and the maintenance of order.<sup>52</sup> The second half of that statement clearly highlights the civil-military relationship in Jamaica. The JDF received support in its development from Britain, Canada, and the United States. Griffith notes that "[u]p to 1977, Jamaica was the only Commonwealth Caribbean country to

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<sup>49</sup> Morris, *Caribbean Maritime Security*, 36.

<sup>50</sup> Griffith, *The Quest*, 133.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 133.

<sup>52</sup> Jamaican Information Service (JIS) located on the Internet.

get military assistance under the IMET (International Military Education and Training) Program."<sup>53</sup> In addition to IMET and other development funds, the United States also materially helped Jamaica establish its modest Air Wing and Coast Guard.

While Jamaica neither produces military arms, nor conducts military-related research and development, it does have one of the most significant military inventories in the region. Jamaica primarily uses equipment produced by Britain, Canada, and the United States, with the emphasis recently on the United States. The Air Wing, consisting primarily of Beechcraft-like aircraft and light helicopters, is not equipped for combat operations. However, it is equipped to conduct search and rescue (SAR), ground force liaison, transport missions, as well as counternarcotic operations.

The Coast Guard, a branch of the JDF, is heavily involved in the country's counternarcotics effort, as well as being charged with SAR, and environmental and fishery protection. Michael Morris, in his book Caribbean Maritime Security, has ranked Jamaica's Coast Guard as a second rank coast guard (one being the lowest and three being the

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<sup>53</sup> Griffith, *The Quest*, 134.

highest). Rank two implies that the JDFCG can perform irregular and spotty law enforcement, usually generating from a single base.<sup>54</sup> However, Morris's rankings were based on 1992 data, and since that time, Jamaica has opened at least one new base, located in the Pedro Cays, and has continued to improve its capabilities.<sup>55</sup> Rear Admiral Peter Brady, the Chief of Staff of the JDF is considered to be one of the most professional and finest officers in the Caribbean.<sup>56</sup> Writing in Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, Commander Adams addresses the professionalism of the JDFCG when he states that:

The JDFCG officer corps epitomizes professionalism in the Caribbean. Many of the officers are trained at the British military academy at Sandhurst, and most, after transfer from the main body of the JDF, prefer to remain in the Coast Guard. Most are skilled seamen, knowledgeable engineers, and strong leaders who seek to improve their skills and equipment.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Morris, *Caribbean Maritime Security*, 29.

<sup>55</sup> The Pedro Cays sit astride the key sea corridor from Colombia to Jamaica. Construction began on the Pedro Cays base in 1996.

<sup>56</sup> Information obtained during a phone interview with Beverly B. Eighmy, Caribbean Program Officer, State Department INL bureau on 16 March 1998.

<sup>57</sup> Commander Michael A. Adams, "In Our Nations' Interests," *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute* No. 116 (March 1990): 104 quoted in Ivelaw L. Griffith, *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean: Problems and Promise in Subordinate States* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993), Pg. 139.

**b) The Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF)**

The Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF) was formed in 1867, nearly one hundred years before independence. However, the JCF has been plagued with poor training, low budgets, poor salaries, and insufficient manpower to address its workload. Additionally, it has developed a bad reputation for violations of civil and political rights.<sup>58</sup> Americas Watch "documented an average of 217 police killings annually between 1979 and 1986."<sup>59</sup> In the last few years, numerous efforts have been undertaken to improve the JCF's training, professionalism, equipment, as well as its efficiency and efficacy. The JDF and the JCF have a history of cooperation and joint operations.

**E. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES**

The United States plays a crucial role for the JDF, providing badly needed equipment and money. For example, the new JDFCG base in the Pedro Cays was constructed primarily with funds provided by the United States. The base is located in a strategic sea corridor frequently utilized by narcotraffickers. Additionally, in the last few

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<sup>58</sup> Griffith, *The Quest*, 139-140.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 140.

years, U.S. funds have been used to finance the dry-dock repair of two of Jamaica's patrol boats at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Lastly, in December 1996, the first class graduated from the Caribbean Regional Drug Law Enforcement Training Center in Jamaica. The first class to graduate from the two week course had 25 students, 13 of whom were Jamaican, with the remaining 12 from nine other Caribbean islands. The government of the United States largely funded the program, which is a project of the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP), and the government of Jamaica.<sup>60</sup>

## **F. JAMAICAN COOPERATION AND CONFLICT**

### **1. Cooperative Efforts**

Jamaica is a member to a host of regional and international counternarcotic agreements. Those include: the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP), Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP), International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Caribbean Law Enforcement and Intelligence Committee (CLEIC), and the Model Maritime Agreement with the United

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<sup>60</sup> INSCR, 190.

States. Additionally, Jamaica has entered into mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) with 48 designated commonwealth states.<sup>61</sup>

Jamaica and the United States have a history of cooperation in counternarcotic efforts, and continue to work together in a variety of operations. Operation Prop Lock, initiated in January 1995, is an ongoing joint U.S.-Jamaican effort that targets U.S. registered planes that attempt to smuggle drugs from Jamaica to the United States. Once caught, the planes are confiscated, impounded, then sold. The profits from the seizures are used to enhance Jamaican counternarcotic capabilities.<sup>62</sup>

In addition to Operation Prop Lock, Jamaica actively supports U.S. counternarcotic intelligence collection efforts, which are crucial to successful interdiction efforts. Jamaica is part of the Joint Information Coordination Center (JICC), along with Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, The Dominican Republic, Belize, Grenada, and Guyana. The JICCs are electronically connected to the Drug Enforcement Agency's El Paso Information Center (EPIC). According to the 1997 International Narcotics Strategy

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 192.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 190. Also, Griffith, *Drugs and Security*, 215.

Control Report "[c]ooperation between the JCF narcotics division and DEA's Kingston country office remains high. This cooperation resulted in the DEA-directed arrest of over 90 major drug traffickers in 1996, versus 86 in 1995 and only 40 in 1994."<sup>63</sup>

Perhaps the most significant example of Jamaican-U.S. cooperation is the May 1997 signing of a maritime counternarcotics agreement. The six-part agreement is a significant improvement over existing agreements and treaties. The six portions of the maritime agreement are: shipboarding, shiprider, pursuit, entry-to-investigate, overflight, and order-to-land. "Shipboarding" provides the authority for the USCG to stop, board, and search foreign vessels suspected of trafficking narcotics, while "shiprider" allows law enforcement officials to embark on host nation vessels, and may then authorize various law enforcement actions. "Pursuit" authorizes U.S. assets to pursue suspected fleeing vessels or aircraft into foreign airspace and waters, while "entry-to-investigate" provides authority for U.S. assets to enter foreign waters or airspace to investigate vessels located therein, and suspected of illicit traffic. "Overflight" and "order-to-

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 191.



land" grant standing authority for U.S. government assets to fly in foreign airspace when in support of counternarcotic operations, and to order to land in the host nation any aircraft suspected of trafficking narcotics.

In essence, this agreement represents a comprehensive attempt to stiffen interdiction efforts by removing the ability of narcotraffickers to 'escape' into territorial waters, and also to improve interdiction efforts by providing for near seamless hot-pursuit of suspects. Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, and Trinidad & Tobago have signed similar six-part model maritime agreements.<sup>64</sup>

## **2. Diplomatic Disputes**

However, Jamaica does not always cooperate with the United States; it also has a history of diplomatic conflict with the United States. The aforementioned maritime agreement provides a perfect illustration. While Jamaica did in fact sign an agreement, it was not until it had hotly negotiated it, made bellicose statements about imposition from the North, and tried to get the rest of the signatories

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<sup>64</sup> Unpublished State Department matrix provided during August 1997 State Department visit.

to renege on their agreements and renegotiate from a position of strength as a single entity.<sup>65</sup>

Jamaica stated that by its domestic laws it could not allow a foreign entity to perform law enforcement activities within its declared 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ).<sup>66</sup> Jamaica consistently cited issues of national sovereignty and respect for its territorial waters and airspace. However, in December 1996, the Government of Jamaica formally withdrew its EEZ declaration, opening the door for negotiation. After months of negotiation, a compromise was reached, and Jamaican Prime Minister P.J. Patterson signed the agreement. The compromise included clauses that prevent the U.S. from randomly patrolling Jamaican territorial waters and airspace, and from entering those same areas without prior approval. Further, the agreement denies diplomatic immunity, and its legal privileges, to U.S. personnel working on counternarcotic operations in Jamaican territory.

Throughout the negotiation process, Jamaica repeatedly tried to persuade other Caribbean nations to join it in its

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<sup>65</sup> Interviews with State Department and Central Intelligence Agency analysts while in Washington, D.C. during the week of 28 July--01 August 1997.

<sup>66</sup> INSCR, 191.

efforts to negotiate a single treaty for the Caribbean.<sup>67</sup> Only Barbados, which had not yet signed an agreement, followed Jamaica's lead, and signed the same agreement. However, numerous regional newspapers criticized their governments for the agreements they signed, and for not having negotiated an agreement that would better protect national sovereignty.<sup>68</sup>

In the end however, despite the political grandstanding and negotiating, an agreement was reached, and Jamaica continues its cooperation with the United States in counternarcotics.<sup>69</sup> Additionally, in order to implement the agreement and enhance efforts, Jamaica changed some of its laws, enacted new legislation, and is setting up a one-stop agency for approving patrol and hot pursuit requests. Thus, while Jamaica challenged the United States, and in fact

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<sup>67</sup> Interviews with State Department and Central Intelligence Agency officials while in Washington, D.C. during the week of 28 July-01 August 1997.

<sup>68</sup> The Trinidad and Tobago newspapers "Newsday" and "Guardian" carried numerous articles and columns criticizing the government for signing the agreement in its original draft form. Meanwhile the Jamaican newspaper the "Gleaner", and "Bridgetown Daily" in Barbados, carried articles and columns praising their governments for negotiating an agreement that protected their countries' sovereignty, and provided for reciprocity.

<sup>69</sup> In December 1997, Jamaica held national elections, which resulted in a historic third term for Prime Minister P.J. Patterson. During the time preceding the election, U.S.-Jamaican relations, as well as Jamaican-Cuban-American relations were very significant issues.

encouraged other countries in the Caribbean to do the same, it signed an historic agreement that opens the door for further cooperation throughout the region.

#### **G. CONCLUSION**

As has been shown throughout this chapter Jamaica clearly cooperates with the United States. This is evidenced not only by Jamaica's actions in the realm of international narcotics, but also in a host of other non-narcotics related issues. For example, Jamaica supported the U.S. physically, and more importantly diplomatically, when it invaded Grenada in 1983, and intervened in Haiti in 1994. However, Jamaica does not just espouse the Washington D.C. line or provide blanket approval for all policies originating in the United States. Numerous times in history, over a wide array of issues, Jamaica has challenged the United States in the diplomatic and political arenas. A frequent point of contention between the United States and Jamaica are issues of national sovereignty, and a perception of imposition from big brother in the North.

This is perhaps best illustrated by the recent event of June 1997, in which a U.S. law enforcement team aboard a British Naval vessel boarded a Jamaican fishing vessel. Personnel from the British vessel, H.M.S. Liverpool, stated

that the Jamaican vessel, the Silverdollar, was a narcotrafficker. Accordingly, the U.S.-British team boarded and searched the Jamaican vessel. Instantly Jamaica protested claiming that the vessel was in Jamaica's twelve nautical mile territorial waters, and that the team had no right to board the vessel. The British and the Americans claim that the vessel was out of Jamaica's territorial limit, and that it did have a right to board the vessel.

Jamaica diplomatically protested, and complained that the United States and Britain had violated its sovereignty, and that they were calling Jamaica a liar. The Silverdollar event resulted in a great deal of grandstanding and received extensive press throughout the Caribbean. Nonetheless, only a few weeks later, with the issue seemingly unsolved, Jamaica signed legislation vital to implementing the maritime cooperation agreement.

Without doubt, a certain degree of the difficulty associated with both the signing of the cooperation agreement, and the Silverdollar can be attributed to pre-election maneuvering in Jamaica. However, a significant amount can also be attributed to Jamaica's legitimate concerns for its national sovereignty. Further, Jamaica has always viewed itself as a regional leader and protector of small states in the Caribbean. Accordingly, while Jamaica

has traditionally received higher levels of attention from Washington because of its size and proximity to the U.S., it has not always quietly accepted Washington's 'advice,' and in fact, on numerous occasions has openly confronted the United States.

In conclusion, I believe that as the United States has been able to get Jamaica to cooperate on counternarcotics in the past, there is a chance for further cooperation within the region. Jamaica has signed the maritime agreement, which could serve as a crucial stepping stone for further regional cooperation in the war against drugs. Jamaica is without doubt one of the toughest islands in the Caribbean to influence, and now that it is a member of the model maritime agreement, further cooperation should be possible. Jamaica exerts a large degree of influence in the Caribbean, and could serve as a direct liaison and a force to encourage other Caribbean countries to sign the remainder of the agreement.<sup>70</sup>

The Caribbean states realize that the nature and scope of the narcotics problem is not just a national problem, or even an inter-regional problem, but rather one that it is a

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<sup>70</sup> Numerous countries in the region, besides those already mentioned that have signed the full six-part agreement, have signed portions of the agreement, but not all of it.

global epidemic. Consequently, it requires cooperation. Their small size, budget, and highly limited resources require that the region pull its resources together to achieve a synergistic effect.

One of the primary reasons that Jamaica has continued to cooperate with the United States, despite obvious differences of opinion, is because they, like the United States, recognize that they cannot beat narcotraffickers by themselves. In other words, they view the inevitable infringements on their sovereignty and pride that may result by closely cooperating with the United States as an acceptable price to pay, given the size and nature of the threat. Further, in dealing with the United States, as evidenced above, there is room for negotiation. Narcotraffickers and the powerful interests they represent pay no such respect to the national sovereignty of a nation, or its population. The implication of this is that the possibility exists for further cooperation on counternarcotics throughout the Caribbean.





#### IV. TESTING THE WATERS

*Cooperation requires that the actions of separate individuals or organizations-which are not in pre-existent harmony-be brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation, which is often referred to as 'policy coordination'.<sup>71</sup>*

##### A. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

In the previous chapters I have shown that cooperation on counternarcotics has already taken place and continues to take place. The existence of "ship-rider" agreements with numerous countries of the region, specifically the countries of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago, which have all signed the full six-part multi maritime agreement, signals the presence of widespread cooperation. However, I believe that the potential for further cooperation now exists.

In After Hegemony, Robert O. Keohane states that international regimes reflect patterns of cooperation, as well as those of discord over time. Therefore, focusing on regimes leads one to examine long-term patterns of behavior. Additionally, it has been said that regimes rarely are formed out of chaos, rather, they arise from situations of

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<sup>71</sup> Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 51.

existing relationships. In other words, the formation of international regimes takes time; it is not a single iteration process, but rather an ongoing series of processes.

The relations between the U.S. and the Caribbean have existed (and been developed) over a long period of time. They have not always been the best, certainly they have not been symmetrical, nor always in the best interests of one another. Yet, certainly it can be said that each has played important roles in the history and policies of the other. Through the years, the two entities have existed in close proximity, developing multiple channels of communication and interaction across an array of issues: governmental, societal, and economic in nature. In the post-Cold War era, free from the ideological struggles of the East-West conflict, the United States and the Caribbean have the opportunity to interact and grow even closer.

### **1. Regime Definitions**

According to Roger Toose, there are three primary definitions of regimes. They start with John Ruggie's broad definition, generally considered to be the first, with perhaps a more limited definition at the other end of the spectrum adopted more recently, and Stephen Krasner's in the

middle.<sup>72</sup> Ruggie's definition postulates that regimes exist in every substantive issue area where regularity in behavior exists. The second definition, by Krasner says, "regimes are sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations."<sup>73</sup> The third, and most useful definition, according to Tooze, sees regimes as multilateral arrangements among nations which seek to regulate state actions in a given issue area. The most effective regimes, and the most useful regime analysis, are those that focus upon a single and well defined issue area, such as counternarcotics.<sup>74</sup>

## **2. Why Regimes Exist**

According to Keohane, regimes exist to facilitate the making of specific cooperative agreements among governments.<sup>75</sup> An important point to note about regimes is

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<sup>72</sup> Roger Tooze, "Regimes and International Cooperation" from A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor ed, *Frameworks For International Cooperation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 204.

<sup>73</sup> Stephen Krasner as quoted by Roger Tooze in "Regimes and International Cooperation", 204.

<sup>74</sup> Roger Tooze, "Regimes and International Cooperation", 212.

<sup>75</sup> Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 62.

that they do not require harmony, nor do they require the absence of conflict. In other words, cooperation and regimes can exist through conflict, and do not require an unattainable state of complete harmony. Perhaps their only real requirement is a convergence amongst the member states upon an issue area. That is to say that those states realize that altering their policies to facilitate cooperation on a certain issue is in their national interest.

When states do a cost and benefit analysis and come to the conclusion that cooperating on a specific issue furthers their national interests, then that is a sufficient motivation to cooperate, as states seek to advance their national interests where possible. Each state's motivations need not be the same, they need not contribute equally, nor be equal in size and power. As such, regimes can be made up of a hegemon and smaller states, which is the situation that exists with the U.S. and Caribbean. According to Keohane, "[I]ntergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of

their own objectives, as the result of policy coordination."<sup>76</sup>

Following this logic, it is likely that regimes will become more and more prevalent in the New World order. With the emergence of Samuel Huntington's "third wave", and the well documented spread of democracy, as well as the emergence of the global economy, there will likely be more convergence on policy issues.<sup>77</sup> This convergence will encourage the development of more regimes, as ultimately regimes exist to facilitate cooperation and reduce discord.

## **B. INDICATORS**

Having established that international regimes exist to facilitate cooperation among states, and further that they do not arise out of chaos, rather they are built upon one another, the next step is to test the potential for an explicit counternarcotics regime between the island nations of the Caribbean and the United States. In approaching this task, I have chosen three key indicators for the Caribbean, and two indicators for the United States. I believe that based on the breadth and importance of these indicators, it

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<sup>76</sup> Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 52.

<sup>77</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Tulsa: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).

can be said that if in fact these situations do exist, then further cooperation may be possible. Should these indicators exist, it will demonstrate that cooperation is in the interests of all parties, and that they in fact realize this and have begun to foster further cooperation.

The first Caribbean indicator is the realization by the island nations that they have a domestic drug problem stemming from the dangers of drug trafficking and consumption, and the resultant problems associated with them. Further, as a result of this recognition, the governments have developed a will to stop the trafficking and abuse of narcotics. The second indicator is actual steps taken to demonstrate this will against drugs, that is, concrete actions against drugs. The third, and last indicator, is a demonstration by the islands that further cooperation is not only necessary, but also desired.

The United States' indicators are twofold. The first is the existence of a national and governmental will to further the level of cooperation in counternarcotics, specifically in the critical transit zones of the Caribbean. The second indicator is the concrete actions that the U.S. government has taken to both encourage and improve the level of cooperation on counternarcotics in that same region. If it can be demonstrated that the aforementioned indicators do

in fact exist, then I believe that the potential for widespread cooperation will have been shown to exist. The aforementioned indicators to be tested are shown below in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1  
**Potential for a Counternarcotics Regime:  
U.S. and Caribbean Indicators**

Indicator Number	Caribbean	United States
One	Realization of drug Problem leads to governmental will to stop drugs	National will to further level of cooperation on counternarcotics
Two	Actual concrete actions against drugs	Concrete actions taken to improve and encourage cooperation in the Caribbean
Three	Demonstration by the Caribbean that they desire and require further cooperation	Not Applicable

Source: Author.

### **C. THE CARIBBEAN: INDICATOR ONE**

The first indicator that is to be tested is the recognition by the Caribbean that they have a domestic drug problem, and that they realize they must take actions against drugs. As was shown in Chapter III (Jamaican Case Study), there exists a significant drug problem in Jamaica. This problem has been translated into increased levels of domestic violence, the formation of dangerous and well armed Posses associated with the trafficking of illicit narcotics,

a dramatic rise in the crime rate, and an increase in the number of patients being treated at drug clinics and hospitals. If this situation existed only in Jamaica, that would hardly demonstrate a drug problem throughout the region. However, that simply is not the case. The situation in Jamaica is present in many islands of the region.

The link between increasing drug use and crime is most visible in those transit states typically associated with drug trafficking: The Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts-Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. In 1995, Puerto Rico had the highest per capita murder rate in the United States, 64 percent of which were drug related. In just one short year the number of murders increased by 188 from 680 to 868, with 80 percent of them being drug related.<sup>78</sup> According to Professor Ivelaw Griffith, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago has said that 75-80 percent of their murders in 1996 were drug related.<sup>79</sup> The Port of Spain prison in Trinidad and Tobago was built to hold 250 inmates. In 1994, its daily

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<sup>78</sup> Griffith, *Drugs and Security*, 2.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 122.



average was 1,100. Most of these inmates were serving sentences related to drug offenses.<sup>80</sup>

In 1994, the U.S. State Department announced that St. Vincent and the Grenadines were the Caribbean's second largest producers of marijuana, while the largest, Jamaica, is geographically thirty times the size of St. Vincent and the Grenadines.<sup>81</sup> The 1997 INSCR, said that production, consumption, and trafficking in St. Vincent and the Grenadines continues to expand. Additionally, many of the islands not typically associated with trafficking are making large busts of marijuana, cocaine, crack, and heroin.

As a result of the increases in crime associated with drug use, the tourism industry in many countries has suffered as well, which is a serious problem for their tiny fragile economies. The Bahamas, Barbados, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, and Trinidad and Tobago are all said to have suffered losses in their respective tourism industries as a result of image problems from drugs.

The above examples were all from primary transit states. However, the problems run much deeper than that. On 2 December 1996, Aruba was added to the list of countries

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 145.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 2.

considered to be major illicit drug-transit countries. Simultaneously, the Netherlands Antilles was added to the list of countries considered to be potentially significant drug-transit countries.<sup>82</sup> Further, according to the INSCR, the use of cocaine in Aruba is increasing at an "alarming rate."<sup>83</sup> Crack use in the Netherlands Antilles is reported to be growing at an "alarming rate" as well, as is the level of petty crime associated with drug abuse.<sup>84</sup>

In Barbados, the availability and use of drugs in schools has increased so significantly that the Minister of Education proposed that teachers be allowed to search students for drugs and weapons.<sup>85</sup> Like many of the other islands of the Eastern Caribbean, drug use, specifically cocaine and crack, is on the rise in Grenada. St. Lucia is said to be plagued by a significant cocaine and marijuana consumption problem which, as in most of the rest of the region, has given rise to the level of violent crime.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> President William Clinton, *Letter from the President to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House Committees on Appropriations and International Relations and The Senate Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Relations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), 1.

<sup>83</sup> INSCR, 167.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 199.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 214.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 219.

On February 13, 1998, Wrenford Ferrance, Antigua's top counternarcotics figure, was nearly assassinated while driving his car. In 1995 in Trinidad, a former attorney general was assassinated in front of his home. Both crimes, although officially unsolved, were blamed on drug lords. The list of crime and drug abuse problems could go on for pages. The problems plague the entire region, and are only getting worse.

The translation of the drug problem into a governmental will against the trafficking of illicit narcotics began about a decade ago when it was realized that it was no longer simply a supply and demand issue involving only South America and the U.S. Rather, it was realized that the scourge of drugs had evolved into not only a hemispheric problem, but a global one as well.

The best examples of governmental will are the numerous statements by individual leaders and regional organizations declaring drugs and drug trafficking threats to the sovereignty and legitimacy of regional governments. For example, in 1996 the leaders of CARICOM issued the following statement: "Heads of Government recognized that narco-trafficking and its associated evils of money laundering, gun smuggling, corruption of public officials, criminality, and drug abuse constitute *the major security threat to the*

entire Caribbean today (emphasis, mine)."<sup>87</sup> Perhaps an even stronger signal is the following quote from the West Indies Commission:

Nothing poses greater threats to civil society in [Caribbean] countries than the drug problem, and nothing exemplifies the powerlessness of regional governments more...It is a many-layered danger...On top of all this lie the implications for governance itself-at the hands of both external agencies engaged in international interdiction, and the drug barons themselves - the 'dons' of the modern Caribbean - who threaten governance from within.<sup>88</sup>

These high level statements are only two of a growing number, but they indicate the very real threat that the region feels. This realization has been translated into the creation of numerous organizations and the signing of a large number of multilateral and bilateral treaties. Many of these have been mentioned in the two preceding chapters, however, a few deserve further attention. On a symbolic level, the effect that every nation in the region, including Cuba, has signed the 1988 United Nations Convention against the trafficking of illicit narcotics, cannot be overstated. As recently as mid-1995, numerous countries in the region

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<sup>87</sup> Communiqué, Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Barbados, December 16, 1996, as quoted in Griffith, *Drugs and Security*, 3.

<sup>88</sup> West Indian Commission, *Time For Action: The Report of the West Indian Commission*. (Black Rock, Barbados, 1992), 1.

including Cuba, Jamaica, Haiti, St. Lucia, St. Kitts-Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago had not ratified that convention, but now everyone has. This perhaps shows a recognition that the individual countries realize that their tiny islands are being negatively affected by drugs, and now they are ready to do something about it.

Another highly significant effort is the signing of the six-part multi maritime agreement by all the members of CARICOM. Given some of the countries involved, namely Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, and their importance in the drug trade, the enormity and importance of this diplomatic triumph should not be downplayed. Without doubt, it shows a regional awareness of the scourge of the drug trade, while simultaneously indicating a commitment to battling it.

#### **1. Indicator Two**

The second indicator, the level of actual concrete action, is perhaps the easiest to measure because it is more than just statements, while simultaneously being the hardest to put into perspective. Throughout this thesis, numbers have been given on the size and scope of the drug trade, as well as those of acres and plants eradicated, arrests made, drugs seized, and so forth. Yet, given the size of the problem, and its secretive nature, it is tough at times to

put these numbers into perspective. However, it can be said that more countries than ever are cooperating with the U.S. on counternarcotics. Countries in the Caribbean that used to resist implementing eradication policies are now doing so, albeit slowly. Nations that used to deny the U.S. hot-pursuit into their sovereign waters and airspace are now permitting it. Many of the islands had either no, or very weak legislation against drug use and narcotics trafficking. However, that currently is changing.<sup>89</sup> Countries that used to be openly corrupt have cracked down on corruption, implementing new legislation and pursuing crimes of illegal personal enrichment.

Specifically, on 29 March 1996, the member countries of the OAS adopted the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. Adopted at the third plenary session, the anti-corruption convention is the first of its kind in the world. In the document the members state that they are "convinced that corruption undermines the legitimacy of public institutions and strikes at society, moral order and justice..."<sup>90</sup> The document further states that the members

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<sup>89</sup> For a comprehensive list of recent and ongoing legal reforms see Griffith, *Drugs and Security*, Chapter 4.

<sup>90</sup> Organization of American States, *Inter-American Convention Against Corruption*. Adopted at the third plenary session held on March 29, 1996, 1.

are concerned about the links between corruption and proceeds generated by illicit narcotics, and state that they are determined to make every effort to punish and eradicate corruption.

Another example of concrete action is in the status of regional counterdrug forces. Many are being upgraded in either size or equipment, frequently with U.S. Department of State INL funds. In January 1996, the Netherlands Antilles, Aruba, and the Netherlands formed a joint Coast Guard to improve counternarcotics efforts in and around the territorial waters of the Netherlands Kingdom's Caribbean islands.<sup>91</sup>

However, despite the attractiveness of some of the mind-boggling numbers such as numbers of arrests, drugs confiscated, and hectares eradicated, perhaps a better measure of effectiveness is to look at some of the interactions and meetings taking place. The biggest success is the monthly meeting of the Caribbean Law Enforcement and Intelligence Committee (CLEIC). The CLEIC meets once a month at the U.S. Coast Guard base in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Numerous high-level counterdrug officials and officers attend this meeting from the United States, British Virgin

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<sup>91</sup> INSCR, 165.

Islands, Caribbean Commonwealth Islands, French Islands, and Netherlands Antilles, and attendance is reportedly increasing monthly. The meetings have begun to facilitate better flows of communication from both the island to the U.S. perspective, and vice versa, but also from the island to island perspective as well. As a result of these meetings, more and more intelligence has begun to be passed both formally, and informally through case officer to case officer discussions.<sup>92</sup>

A second example highlighting the commitment and improvements at the tactical level are the annual meetings of the Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (HONLEA). HONLEA is a subsidiary body of the United Nations. Its member states in the Caribbean are: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. France, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States are also member states. Additionally, Anguilla, Aruba, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico,

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<sup>92</sup> Information obtained from a phone interview with Office of Naval Intelligence employee Champee Hartwell, on February 17, 1998. Subject is also an officer in the Coast Guard reserves who recently returned from 11 months of working counternarcotic issues in Puerto Rico.



Turks and Caicos Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands are all associate members.

For eight years the member countries, associate members, and metropolitan powers have gotten together and discussed individual and regional efforts in an attempt to improve upon existing efforts. The meetings have focused upon trafficking trends, the changing structures and methodology of drug-trafficking organizations, investigative techniques, and managing undercover operations.<sup>93</sup>

At the national level, a variety of treaties have been signed and declarations issued stating the intent of the region and individual countries to fight the scourge of drugs. For example, in October 1996, the OAS Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS-CICAD) passed a resolution establishing an anti-drug strategy in the hemisphere. According to the OAS, the strategy "...[R]epresents a fresh commitment to international cooperation to combat the drug problem based on the

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<sup>93</sup> UN Information Services, *Drug Law Enforcement in Latin America and Caribbean To Be Discussed at UN Meeting in Buenos Aires*, 12 September 1997, 1. (UN website). In addition to the aforementioned members, Mexico and most of Central and South America are members as well.

principle of shared responsibility and the need for a policy that balances preventative and law enforcement measures." <sup>94</sup>

However, there is more going on in Caribbean counternarcotics than just meetings with their requisite declarations, statements, and treaties. At the tactical level there are numerous annual combined operations involving not only the United States, but also numerous regional counternarcotic forces. For example, Caribe Venture is a Coast Guard sponsored series of recurrent multinational operations in the Eastern Caribbean. Participants extend legal authority to the counter-drug forces of other nations that permit entry and pursuit of suspects through sovereign waters and air space. The four operations of 1996 were widely participated in, with partners including: United Kingdom dependent territories, the Netherlands Antilles, French West Indies, Dominican Republic, Antigua & Barbuda, St Kitts & Nevis, Anguilla & Montserrat, and Dominica.<sup>95</sup>

While Caribe Venture is a great example, it is by no means the only multinational counternarcotics operation

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<sup>94</sup> In January of 1997, the OAS-CICAD had 31 member-nations. Organization of American States, *Annual Report-Inter American Commission*, 1997, 2. Obtained via the OAS website. Located at: [www.oas.org](http://www.oas.org)

<sup>95</sup> INCSR, 49. In addition to the aforementioned partners of Caribe Venture, other RSS members participated in operations conducted in the vicinity of their territorial seas and airspace.

annually undertaken in the Caribbean. Other operations include Operation Gallant Shield in the French West Indies, HALCON in the Dominican Republic, OPBAT in the Bahamas and Florida Straits, and Operation Proplock in Jamaica.<sup>96</sup> Combined operations between the U.S. and Caribbean counternarcotic forces provide an excellent opportunity for practical training for all forces involved, improving the indigenous capability of regional forces. Additionally, the size, scope, and level of participation in the operations show a growing resolve to combat drugs and their dangers.

## **2. Indicator Three**

The third Caribbean indicator is the continued and growing level of diplomatic efforts aimed at advancing cooperation throughout the region. At the conclusion of the 1994 Miami Summit, the 34 democracies of the Western Hemisphere issued the Declaration of Miami, which stated that there was a "...need for an integrated, balanced and coordinated approach that will be capable, with full respect for national sovereignty, of effectively confronting all

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid., 49-50.

manifestations of the illicit drug problem."<sup>97</sup> The declaration laid out four steps that were considered necessary in order to develop a comprehensive hemispheric strategy to counter all the dangers of the illicit narcotics trade. The fourth "work area" was to implement international coordination actions in order to interdict the trafficking of narcotics throughout the region.<sup>98</sup>

An additional call for enhanced regional cooperation came from the OAS when they adopted the "*Declaration Affirming Respect for the Personality, Sovereignty, and Independence of States*" during the second plenary session on 2 June 1997.<sup>99</sup> In this document the OAS states that the countries of the Americas face a common enemy in illicit drug trafficking, and that to effectively counter it requires the willing cooperation and collaboration of all states. Further, it urges members to cooperate to wage a concerted effort against illicit drugs in accordance with the United Nations Convention against illicit trafficking of drugs (1988), and for those countries who had not yet done

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<sup>97</sup> Organization of American States, *Hemispheric Security and the Fight Against Drug Trafficking*, no date given, 4. Obtained via the OAS website.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>99</sup> Organization of American States, *Declaration Affirming Respect for the Personality, Sovereignty, and Independence of States*, June 1997, 1.

so to become parties to that convention.<sup>100</sup> Clearly it can be seen from these selections that the OAS believes that further and deepened cooperation is the only way that any success will be achieved in the war against drugs.

The U.S. and Caribbean Summit, which took place in Bridgetown, Barbados on 10 May 1997, is another example of the Caribbean's intent to further cooperation. According to Beverly Eighmy, the Caribbean Program Officer of the INL Bureau at the U.S. State Department, the summit represented a great leap forward towards further cooperation.<sup>101</sup> During the summit, the Bridgetown Declaration of Principles was adopted by all countries in attendance. The declaration is a two part action plan, with the first part addressing trade, development, finances and the environment, while the second part addresses security and justice, much of which concerns countering narcotics.

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<sup>100</sup> As was noted earlier, all the island states of the Caribbean have already become members of the convention.

<sup>101</sup> Information obtained during a phone interview with Beverly B. Eighmy, on 16 March 1998

We recognize the need for greater cooperation of security forces in the region to deal with illicit drug trafficking, alien smuggling, illegal trafficking in arms and threats to stability. We agree that no single nation has the ability to deal effectively with the threats to the security of the region, and that coordination, cooperation, and combined operations are necessary.<sup>102</sup>

A final example showing the desire that the region has to advance cooperation, and the emphasis that it places upon doing so, is the fact that the most recent Inter-American Summit held in Santiago, Chile, focused upon advancing cooperation in counternarcotics. Additionally, a special three-day session of the United Nations General Assembly will be held on 8-10 June 1998, to specifically address the topic of international narcotics, and improving global efforts to combat the dangers of drugs.

Although the Organization of American States is considered at times to be a toothless tiger, and not all the countries of the region have lived up to their obligations in the various treaties discussed earlier, it can nonetheless be seen that the necessity for further cooperation has been advocated and realized by the

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<sup>102</sup> Caribbean/United States Summit, *Partnership For Prosperity and Security In The Caribbean: Bridgetown Declaration of Principles*. Adopted 10 May, 1997, 11.

Caribbean.<sup>103</sup> The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has stated that drugs and its many associated dangers represent the greatest threat to the security of the region. Because of this they established a Joint Committee with the United States to further cooperation on justice and security concerns, and have specifically already begun addressing counternarcotics. The next section evaluates the two U.S. indicators.

#### **D. THE UNITED STATES: INDICATOR ONE**

The first of the two U.S. indicators is statements concerning the necessity to further cooperation on international counternarcotics efforts. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright clearly summarized this view when she said "[n]o nation acting alone can defeat that threat [drug trafficking]. We must work together to eradicate crops, disrupt trafficking, break up cartels, and punish those who would enrich themselves by selling poison to our children."<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> During the phone interview with Beverly B. Eighmy, she stated that while cooperation is improving, there are still many troubled areas. For instance, by June 1998, all the countries of the region are supposed to have ratified the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. However, that did not occur.

<sup>104</sup> Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, press briefing on the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1997. U.S. State Department Internet website. Located at: [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)

In his 1997 State of the Union Address, President Clinton said that the U.S. security strategy is guided by six strategic priorities, one of which is to "increase cooperation in confronting new security threats that defy borders and unilateral solutions."<sup>105</sup> The 1997 National Security Strategy states that the principal security concerns in the hemisphere are transnational in nature. Stating that drug trafficking poses a serious threat to the sovereignty, democracy, and national security of nations in the hemisphere, the United States seeks through bilateral and regional efforts to eliminate the scourge of drug trafficking.

The Office of National Drug Control Policy's strategy includes five goals. Two of these goals are to shield America's borders from the drug threat, and to break both foreign and domestic sources of supply. In this strategy there are objectives which specifically address the need to advance cooperation in order to achieve success in both of these goals.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> President William Clinton, *National Security Strategy For a New Century* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), 5.

<sup>106</sup> President William Clinton, *The National Drug Control Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997).



Clearly it can be seen that the White House desires further cooperation in the war against drugs. In addition to the documents cited above, there is an exponentially growing body of literature, documents, reports, and speeches by U.S. politicians, intelligence agencies, military commanders, and academics, all of which highlight the need for further cooperation.

#### **1. Indicator Two**

The second and final U.S. indicator concerns actual efforts taken by the United States to advance cooperation on counternarcotics in the Caribbean. The number of U.S. lead initiatives to counter drugs is too numerous to address in this chapter, so only a few will be highlighted. According to the ONDCP, since 1992 the U.S. has signed bilateral maritime counternarcotic agreements with 11 nations bordering the Caribbean basin, significantly improving cooperation.

As described in Chapter III (Jamaican Case Study), the recently opened regional law enforcement training center in Jamaica was largely funded with State Department INL funds. Also, as a result of the aforementioned summit in Bridgetown, the U.S. has recently transferred a series of

C-26 aircraft and 82-foot patrol boats to the Caribbean.<sup>107</sup> Both are examples of action taken by the United States to improve capabilities and cooperation in the region.

According to a statement by then-acting Commander in Chief U.S. Southern Command, RADM Doran, multinational cooperation on counternarcotics in the region is at an unprecedented level, and SOUTHCOM is taking efforts to raise that level.<sup>108</sup> According to RADM Doran, U.S. support for counternarcotics in the region is formed on six pillars: intelligence support, detection, monitoring and tracking (DM&T), joint planning assistance teams, logistics support, training support, and communications support. "These six pillars work in concert to provide the crucial link to Host Nation and U.S. successful counterdrug endgames."<sup>109</sup>

In addition to these few specific examples, the State Department, DOD, USCG, DEA, and a wide variety of other organizations have spent millions of dollars, all with the goal of improving the region's institutions and its abilities to combat the dangers of drugs. The current

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<sup>107</sup> Phone interview with Beverly B. Eighmy, and United States Information Service Fact Sheet, *Caribbean Security and Narcotics Interdiction*, December 5, 1997.

<sup>108</sup> RADM Doran, acting CINC SOUTHCOM, statement given on July 16, 1997, before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, 14. Obtained via the Internet.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., 6.

emphasis in both the National Security Strategy and the ONDCP's counterdrug policy, on cooperating in a true multinational effort is an indication of the realization by the U.S. government that the problem is too big to be defeated alone. Additionally, it is a reflection of the changing security environment in the post-Cold War. The days of throwing a few million dollars at the Caribbean and hoping the problem would go away are gone and the emphasis placed up true cooperation are an indication of this.

The ONDCP's strategy makes the following observation which perhaps best illustrates the United States desire to facilitate, and advance cooperation on counternarcotics:


The growing trend toward greater counternarcotics cooperation in the Western Hemisphere is creating unprecedented opportunities for governments to eviscerate the drug threat while promoting more cordial, productive relations between the United States and the rest of the region. The era in which the region's antidrug efforts have been driven largely by a series of distinct, bilateral initiatives between the United States and selected Latin American and Caribbean countries is giving way to one that increasingly includes new multilateral approaches. The institutions and many of the mechanisms to make such cooperation succeed are in place or under development. It is in our interest--and the interests of the other countries in the region--to enhance these institutions and accelerate the multilateral process, culminating in a hemispheric alliance against the drug threat.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> United States Department of State, *Enhanced Multilateral Drug Control Cooperation: A Counternarcotics Alliance for the Hemisphere*,

I believe that because of the three Caribbean and two U.S. indicators which I have shown to exist, the formation of a counternarcotics regime in the region is possible. The relationship and possible result is demonstrated in Figure 4.1 below.

Figure 4.1  
**Potential For Widespread Counternarcotics Cooperation**  
CARIBBEAN                      UNITED STATES



Source: Author.

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Section V., 1. Obtained via the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) webpage.

## V. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS THE FUTURE

*Just like American policy-makers and public servants have to rethink and redesign their attitudes towards the region, Caribbean leaders also have to realize that the challenges of the post-Cold War era require new approaches and solutions.<sup>111</sup>*

### A. SUMMARY

As has been shown throughout the preceding chapter, cooperation between the United States and the Caribbean is taking place at a variety of levels of the drug war, through multiple efforts and organizations. Further, the potential for increased cooperation exists because of the reasons that were indicated in Chapter IV.

However, to say that currently there is cooperation is not to say that there are not problems as well. Corruption continues to be one of the biggest problems in the region. Without doubt, not all of the countries have lived up to all of the agreements to which they are party. Some countries have yet to pass legislation implementing conventions such as the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. Many

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<sup>111</sup> Holger Henke, *"Between rocks and a hard place: the 'shiprider controversy' and the question of Caribbean sovereignty"*, 1997, 10. Obtained via the Internet.

countries have either no laws, or almost no laws, forbidding money laundering, which helps perpetuate the drug problem.

However, as was mentioned at the beginning of the preceding chapter, cooperation is not synonymous with harmony, nor does it require the absence of conflict. Despite some of the aforementioned problems, there is a higher level of cooperation than ever before. Countries like Trinidad and Tobago are cooperating at exceptionally high levels, and are making a difference. Because of many of the successes in interdiction in the transit zones, traffickers are switching their routes to less efficient ones. Recent reporting indicates that traffickers are changing their routes to the Eastern Caribbean and other surreptitious and less direct routes. These new routes and measures are being adopted as a result of successful interdiction efforts in other islands.<sup>112</sup>

As long as there continues to be weak links the traffickers will always have an area to exploit. What is needed is to replace the current myriad of complex, and at times non-supportive, bilateral and multilateral efforts. There needs to be a single comprehensive regime that exists

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<sup>112</sup> The trafficking changes to the Eastern Caribbean have been discussed in many books, newspaper articles, and in interviews conducted by the author.

to counter the multifaceted dangers of illicit narcotics. Such a regime is not only in the U.S. national interest, it is also in the interest of the tiny democracies that constitute the Caribbean. Such a regime would not replace national efforts, it would merely make them more efficient and effective, the value of which cannot be overstated given the miniscule size of the Caribbean's budgets and counternarcotics forces.

### **1. Justification**

Robert Keohane said that international regimes are largely self-interest organizations and that they exist to further a country's national interest. I think that the case has been made showing that cooperating on counternarcotics is in the Caribbean's national interest and that more importantly, the leaders of the region think so as well.

Andrew Axline argues that:

Generally, it can be postulated that a given member state will support a regional proposal that satisfies its own national goals better, or at a lower cost than an alternative proposal, through a simple calculation of the relative costs and benefits of different options.<sup>113</sup>

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
<sup>113</sup> Axline, *Regional Cooperation*, 23.

Axline is describing a situation similar to the one which now exists in the Caribbean. I believe that the countries of the Caribbean that have signed multilateral agreements with the United States, and that have deepened their cooperative efforts throughout the region, have done so because it advances their national interests at a lower cost than that of not doing so at all. In other words, the benefits outweigh the costs. The drug problem is simply too big and too threatening to be dealt with unilaterally, and both the United States and the Caribbean are coming to this pragmatic realization.

From this situation, the logical progression is towards a situation of further integrated and coordinated cooperation throughout the region. I believe that I have shown that an area of overlap exists in the national interests of the United States and the Caribbean. This area of overlap is the perceived threat of drugs, and it is in this overlap that a regime should be formed (see Figure 5.1).



Figure 5.1  
The Caribbean and The United States:  
Convergence of National Interests



\*Shaded area equals potential regime

Source: Author.

## 2. Cooperation Scenarios

Lisa Martin said that there are three types of cooperation "problems."<sup>114</sup> The first is coincidence, whereby countries agree without negotiation to pursue the same policy. There is coercion, where one country has to persuade another to follow the same policy, either by threats, promise of rewards and benefits, or through linkage

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<sup>114</sup> Martin, *Coercive Cooperation*, 25-26.

to other issues. Finally, there is coadjustment, a situation that exists when neither country would pursue the policy alone, but will if the other country does because then they both benefit.

These three scenarios can be used as a tool to understand how further cooperation in the form of an explicit regime focusing upon the countering of narcotics could be formed between the U.S. and the Caribbean. Axline said that regional policies not viewed by some countries to be advancing their national interests, at a lower cost, must if necessary be linked to other policies in order to arrive at agreement. Where possible, this should be avoided, but as one of Martin's three "problems," the coercive method exists for scenarios such as this. Accordingly, there is more than one path towards cooperation.

Where linkage is necessary, international organizations can play a critical role because they can raise the cost of defection from a regime, while simultaneously increasing the credibility of the linkage as well.<sup>115</sup> In the same vein, international organizations such as the United Nations Drug Control Program, and the Organization of American States

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 39.

play an important role in facilitating cooperation, whatever form it takes.

**B. NEXT MILLENNIUM'S DRUG STRATEGY... A POLICY PRESCRIPTION**

In forming America's counterdrug strategy for the next millennium, the United States occupies a unique position. It is the region's strongest power, as well as the globe's only superpower, while simultaneously it is the world's largest consumer of illicit narcotics. The U.S. should take every precaution to ensure that the next millennium's drug strategy is not unilateral and asymmetrically imposed. An honest effort must be placed upon respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Caribbean. The United States should negotiate and engage in diplomacy in good faith, respecting that the leaders of the Caribbean answer to domestic constituencies as well.

Given the current political stability and ideological conformity throughout the region (except Cuba), the growing interdependence of the U.S. and Caribbean relationship, and the regional acceptance of the threat posed by drugs, a truly comprehensive drug strategy is within reach. Despite all the evidence pointing to the potential for increased

cooperation, the road ahead is not easy. Perhaps Michael Morris stated it the best:

The policy dilemma posed by the drug trade for small Caribbean states is that individually they cannot control the drug trade but that a U.S.-controlled, anti-drug strategy for the region may impinge on national sovereignty. For the United States, the Caribbean challenge is to shape a strategy for interdiction of drug-transit routes, acceptable to local states, which is still effective.<sup>116</sup>

Although not easy, the answer lies in the formation of an explicit counternarcotic's regime encompassing the United States and the island Caribbean. The formation of such a regime would advance the national interests of both the U.S. as well as those of the Caribbean, while simultaneously encouraging the more efficient and effective use of scarce resources. I believe that for the reasons I have detailed above the formation of such a regime is now possible and necessary.

The U.S. and Caribbean should unite in a regional approach, drug traffickers respect no national boundaries, and the longer there is a failure to truly cooperate, the more they will exploit their advantages. The failure to establish such a regime threatens the legitimacy, efficacy,

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<sup>116</sup> Morris, *Caribbean Maritime Security*, 141.

sovereignty, and ultimately the stability of the Caribbean, while concurrently leaving the drug pipeline into America wide open.



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